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ELECTRONIC DATA: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW IN
VIRGINIA IN 2007
The Honorable Thomas D. Horne *
I. INTRODUCTION
Just like the day we learned to ride a bike, most of us probably
recall the day we were first introduced to the brave new world of
computers. Little then did we realize, nor do we yet fully recog-
nize, the power locked within the chip that processes our insatia-
ble need for information. It is our good fortune that legal and
ethical standards, rather than technology, continue to guide a
principled approach to the practice of law. Computers and com-
puter-generated data are tools only for processing information, a
means to achieving an end result. Skilled advocacy and accurate
decision-making depend on the collection and collation of infor-
mation in a variety of forms. Now, electronic data provides the
principal medium used in the pursuit of these goals.
Electronic data provides a lawyer with another source from
which to obtain, retain, and disseminate information, albeit a dif-
ferent and novel source. Thus, it should be accorded a like dignity
to that of handwritten and transcribed histories. However, the
accuracy, cost, ease of recovery, and manageability of such data
makes it an increasingly favored tool and target for the practitio-
ner. So enchanted have some become with such data that clearly
identifiable legal issues become clouded by bits and bytes of elec-
tronically maintained information. Litigation has become a
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School of Law), Edward J. O'Shea, III (B.A., 1999, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Can-
didate, 2008, George Mason University School of Law), and Joanne V. Frye (B.A., 2001,
Washington & Jefferson College; J.D., 2004, University of Richmond School of Law).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
search of the information universe about one's adversary, like a
similarly ill-fated search for the fountain of youth.
This article addresses several issues related to the role of elec-
tronic data: how courts and legislatures wrestle with questions
concerning digital information in an attempt to maintain stare
decisis, current legislative attempts to respond to public policy
concerns about such data, and the current expansion of the com-
mon law. Both the civil and criminal law are explored here, as
well as vexing questions about jurisdiction, evidence, and cost. In
each section, seminal cases and legislation are introduced and
then expanded upon with a discussion of the relevant principles.
Each review of a specific legal topic contains thoughts on the fu-
ture course of this burgeoning area of the law.
Hopefully, the reader will take from this article a better under-
standing of how legal issues relating to electronic data may be
approached and understood. Surprisingly, once the practitioner
cuts through the shroud of science and follows Alice through the
looking glass, existing legal concepts remain effective and are a
constant reminder that law finds its strength in the harmonizing
of the old with the new, stability and custom with social change.
Concerns for confidentiality, security, and a desire to communi-
cate ideas to either a single person or to a vast audience portend a
potent mixture for litigation. Applying extant rules and statutes
to legal issues arising from new technologies is not easy. Tradi-
tional molds may result in costly, inequitable, or unconstitutional
results. This article will attempt to explore some of these issues
from the perspective of the daily practice of law. In resolving dis-
putes through trial or settlement, lawyers and courts are faced
with not only the practical application of law to fact, but also
broad policy considerations.
Lastly, I undertake this task with a sense of timidity because
my knowledge of both the language and mechanics of computers,
cell phones, and a host of other digital devices, is limited by both
age and education.
II. ELECTRONIC DATA: A PRIMER
Electronic data includes information stored in electronic form
that can be produced or restored through the application of pro-
grams or software specifically designed to input, store, transmit,
[Vol. 42:355
ELECTRONIC DATA
interpret, and reproduce information or data in either electronic
or print media. It may include the information specifically re-
quested, the hard drive of a computer, a floppy disk, or a compact
disk. Electronic data generally cannot be read or deciphered with-
out the use and application of a software program specifically de-
signed to read or interpret such data. The software program used
to recapture or restore such data or the identity of such a pro-
gram may, therefore, be discoverable. The best evidence of stored
data in electronic form is found in the medium used for storage.
The General Assembly provided a definitional source of com-
puter terms.1 These terms include: computer; computer data;
computer network; computer program; computer services; com-
puter software; and electronic mail service provider.2 The statu-
tory definitions, however, are not as clear as they may appear.
For example, a defendant was convicted by the Virginia Beach
City Circuit Court under Virginia Code section 18.2-178 for ob-
taining a computer software package by false pretense, with in-
tent to defraud, when she paid for the item with an uncollectible
check.3 The defendant appealed her conviction, arguing that the
set of specifications the company delivered, which could be used
to develop a computer program, did not, as charged in the indict-
ment, constitute computer software or a computer program under
Virginia Code section 18.2-152.2.'
The Court of Appeals of Virginia overturned the defendant's
conviction,' holding that the specifications were neither a com-
puter program, that is, "an ordered set of data representing coded
instructions or statements that, when executed by a computer,
causes the computer to perform one or more computer opera-
tions; "' or computer software defined as a "set of computer pro-
grams, procedures and associated documentation concerned with
computer data ....,, The court reasoned that while the specifica-
tions described a computer program that could be created, it was
not currently in a form that could be executed by a computer, or
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.2 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
2. Id.
3. O'Connor v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 416, 417, 430 S.E.2d 567, 567-68 (Ct.
App. 1993).
4. See id.
5. Id. at 418, 430 S.E.2d at 568.
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.2 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
7. Id.
2007]
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cause a computer to perform an operation, and did not relate to
an actual computer program in existence."
III. JURISDICTION
Our inquiry begins with the keystone of dispute resolution-
personal jurisdiction. Given the universal nature of electronic
communications, the practitioner might first ask, can my client be
heard in a Virginia court on an issue dealing with electronic data?
Under familiar principles, for a court in the Commonwealth to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that his allegations fall within the
Virginia Long-Arm Statute9 and that his cause meets the "mini-
mum contacts" requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 10
In Krantz v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l the court found jurisdic-
tion where a claim by a non-resident for tortious interference
with a contract was predicated upon a defendant, a non-resident
member of a labor organization located in Virginia, posting in-
formation on a computer bulletin board maintained by the or-
ganization. 1 The defendant's union placed the plaintiffs name on
a "scab list" after he withdrew from an airline pilots' strike.'2 Af-
ter learning the plaintiff had a successful job interview with an-
other airline, the defendant recorded a message, on his own per-
sonal computer in New York, indicating that the plaintiff was a
"scab."' 3 The defendant then transmitted the message over an
electronic switchboard system, operated by the union from its
headquarters in Virginia, to union members employed at the
other airline. 14
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered the two-pronged
analysis in finding that the plaintiff had established jurisdiction
to pursue his claim in the Commonwealth by first addressing the
8. O'Connor, 16 Va. App. at 418, 430 S.E.2d at 568.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
10. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
11. 245 Va. 202, 202-207, 427 S.E.2d 326, 326-29 (1993).
12. Id. at 204, 427 S.E.2d at 327.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 204-05, 427 S.E.2d at 327.
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application of the Long-Arm Statute to the facts.'5 The court ex-
amined whether the defendant had engaged in some "purposeful
activity in Virginia," and whether the result to be obtained was
governed by prior case law indicating that fraudulent or defama-
tory statements made outside the forum state and then transmit-
ted by telephone or mail were not "acts" within the forum juris-
diction. 6 Ultimately, the court determined that the defendant's
tortious interference was only completed through the specific use
of the computer system operated within the Commonwealth and
the subsequent acts of union members who received his message
regarding the plaintiff. 7 The court reasoned that without the use
of the computer switchboard in Virginia, the defendant could not
have obtained the assistance of others, which was necessary to
establish an element of tortious interference.'" The court chose
not to decide whether the prior case law correctly limited the ap-
plicability of long-arm statutes, so as not to include telephone or
mail contacts, because the subsequent acts required to complete
the tortious interference in this case rendered those cases inap-
plicable. 9
Addressing the Due Process prong of the jurisdictional analy-
sis, the court held that the defendant engaged in purposeful activ-
ity through his use of the computer system operated within the
Commonwealth and the defendant had the minimum contacts
necessary for the plaintiff to maintain his action so that the ac-
tion did not "offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice."'2 °
As early as 1980, the Supreme Court of the United States ob-
served that the limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause on
state long-arm statutes had been significantly relaxed due to "a
fundamental transformation in the American economy."21 The
pervasive use of the Internet in both personal and business
transactions has further transformed our economy and allows an
15. See id. at 205-07, 427 S.E.2d at 328-29.
16. Id. at 205-06, 427 S.E.2d at 328-29.
17. See id. at 206, 427 S.E.2d at 328.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 207, 427 S.E.2d at 328-29; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(B) (Repl. Vol.
2006) ("Using a computer or computer network located in the Commonwealth shall consti-
tute an act in the Commonwealth.").
21. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1980).
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online act within one state to have ramifications far beyond those
implicated in a long-distance telephone call, or the mailing of a
letter to a recipient in another state.
Virginia practitioners should be advised of the varied subse-
quent impacts of an Internet posting or activity conducted physi-
cally in one location, but with the assistance of a computer sys-
tem operated elsewhere. While the case law and Code of Virginia
are clear regarding the specific use of computer systems located
within the Commonwealth,22 current decisions regarding Internet
postings are less clear.
In 2002, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, in Verizon Online Services, Inc. v. Ralsky, found
personal jurisdiction based upon Internet use where the defen-
dants reasonably should have expected to be subject to Virginia
courts because they were "deliberately exploiting" Verizon's e-
mail services for financial gain by transmitting millions of unso-
licited bulk e-mails to the plaintiff through the Internet Service
Provider ("ISP") located in Virginia. 23 The court cited Bochan v.
La Fontaine in reaching its decision on jurisdiction.24 The court in
Bochan noted that Virginia courts commonly premise the exercise
of personal jurisdiction based upon Internet activity by examining
both the nature and quality of the activity. 2' Generally, courts de-
termine whether e-mail has been sent for pecuniary gain rather
than personal purposes, and in the case of the former the courts
find personal jurisdiction.26
In 1999, the Loudoun County Circuit Court was confronted
with a defamation action commenced in Virginia in which the
plaintiff, a Pennsylvania judge, asserted that an unknown indi-
vidual had published defamatory material on a website located on
America Online, an ISP with its principal place of business in
Loudoun County, Virginia. 27 The plaintiff caused a subpoena
duces tecum to be issued from the clerk of the circuit court requir-
ing the service provider produce documents identifying the indi-
vidual who owned the website because no service of process could
22. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
23. 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 616 (E.D. Va. 2002).
24. Id. (citing Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 Supp. 2d 692, 701 (E.D. Va. 1999)).
25. See Bochan, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 701; see also Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
26. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
27. Melvin v. Doe, 49 Va. Cir. 257, 257 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Loudoun County).
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be effected on the defendant in Virginia.28 The defendant then
challenged the jurisdiction of the court by motion and special ap-
pearance.29 In determining whether it had jurisdiction, the court
considered whether the allegations could be reconciled with the
Virginia Long-Arm Statute.3" Relying in part on Krantz, the court
found the allegations sufficient to establish a prima facie showing
for the exercise of jurisdiction under the statute because the ser-
vice provider's server was located within the Commonwealth and
because the server's operation was integral to publication.31
Therefore, the pleading stated a tortious injury caused by an act
or omission in the Commonwealth sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirements of Virginia Code section 8.01-328. 1(A)(3).32
The trial court, however, did not find the facts, as pled, suffi-
cient to satisfy the second prong of the jurisdictional analysis-
the "minimum contacts" requirement.33 The Internet posting in
question did not specifically target a Virginia audience and the
plaintiff did not allege that the defendant lives, works, or main-
tains any personal or business relationships in the Common-
wealth.34 To the contrary, the pleadings established a matter of
local interest that before the creation of the Internet would only
have been published in print by peradventure in the Common-
wealth. 35 Accordingly, without prejudice to proceeding in a proper
forum, the case was dismissed.3" Here, the ISP's location as a
place for passive, non-commercial postings was not enough to sat-
isfy the "minimum contacts" requirement. 7
As will be seen, the Virginia General Assembly has been a
powerful voice in adapting new technologies to existing law. In
2000, the General Assembly enacted the Uniform Computer In-
formation Transactions Act ("UCITA") governing computer in-
formation transactions. 38 The legislature also added section 8.01-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 258.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692, 699 (E.D. Va. 1999)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 259.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Act. of Apr. 9, 2000, ch. 996, 2000 Va. Acts 2228 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
59.1-501 to 509.2 (Repl. Vol. 2006)); J. Douglas Cuthbertson & Glen L. Gross, Annual Sur-
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407.1 to the Virginia Code, providing a helpful and detailed pro-
cedure for obtaining subscriber information from ISPs in civil ac-
tions "where it is alleged that an anonymous individual has en-
gaged in tortious Internet communications."39 In such cases, the
practitioner confronted with such an issue should be aware of
time-sensitive deadlines for making requests, including the re-
quirement that a subpoena and supporting material must be filed
with the court at least thirty days prior to the date disclosure is
sought. 40
The Supreme Court of Virginia, by its decision in America
Online, Inc. v. Nam Tai Electronics, gave guidance for a practi-
tioner seeking discovery of the identity of Internet correspon-
dents.41 In Nam Tai, the plaintiff corporation brought an action
for libel and unfair business practices in California arising from
certain postings on an Internet message board involving publicly
vey of Virginia Law: Technology Law, 37 U. RICH L. REV. 341,341 (2002).
39. Cuthbertson & Gross, supra note 38, at 353.
40. For example, Virginia Code provides:
At least thirty days prior to the date on which disclosure is sought, a party
seeking information identifying an anonymous communicator shall file with
the appropriate circuit court a complete copy of the subpoena and all items
annexed or incorporated therein, along with supporting material showing:
a. That one or more communications that are or may be tortious or
illegal have been made by the anonymous communicator, or that the
party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, good faith basis to
contend that such party is the victim of conduct actionable in the juris-
diction where the suit was filed. A copy of the communications that are
the subject of the action or subpoena shall be submitted.
b. That other reasonable efforts to identify the anonymous com-
municator have proven fruitless.
c. That the identity of the anonymous communicator is important,
is centrally needed to advance the claim, relates to a core claim or de-
fense, or is directly and materially relevant to that claim or defense.
d. That no motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the plead-
ings, or judgment as a matter of law, demurrer or summary judgment-
type motion challenging the viability of the lawsuit of the underlying
plaintiff is pending. The pendency of such a motion may be considered
by the court in determining whether to enforce, suspend or strike the
proposed disclosure obligation under the subpoena.
e. That the individuals or entities to whom the subpoena is ad-
dressed are likely to have responsive information.
f. If the subpoena sought relates to an action pending in another
jurisdiction, the application shall contain a copy of the pleadings in
such action, along with the mandate, writ or commission of the court
where the action is pending that authorizes the discovery of the infor-
mation sought in the Commonwealth.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
41. 264 Va. 583, 590-95, 571 S.E.2d 128, 132-35 (2002).
[Vol. 42:355
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traded stock in the corporation.42 Pursuant to a commission is-
sued by the California court, a subpoena duces tecum was issued
directing the ISP to produce subscriber information relating to
the author of a posting made under an anonymous screen name.43
The ISP, with corporate offices located in Loudoun County, Vir-
ginia, filed a motion to quash on behalf of its anonymous sub-
scriber.44 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision of
the trial court that declined America Online's request to quash
the subpoena.45 Interestingly, the Virginia court requested a
clarifying order from the California court prior to deciding the
motion.46 In so doing, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted the
similarities between the procedures governing such motions in
California and Virginia.47
IV. DISCOVERY
In preparation for both civil and criminal trials, a lawyer may
be required to take steps that are directly related to electronic
data. Thus, he or she may be called upon to preserve, acquire,
catalogue, or protect electronic data. As part of the pretrial dis-
covery process, it may be necessary to identify electronic data and
to prepare suitable responses to specific discovery requests.
Discovery may include depositions, written interrogatories, re-
quests for admissions, and subpoenas to third parties. Before a
response can be initiated or a request tailored to the issues pre-
sented in a case, it is important to identify what data is re-
quested, in what form it is kept, and how it is relevant to the is-
sues presented by the underlying action. The Rules of the
Supreme Court of Virginia provide:
42. See id. at 586, 571 S.E.2d at 129.
43. See id. at 587-88, 571 S.E.2d at 130.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 596, 571 S.E.2d at 135.
46. Id. at 589, 571 S.E.2d at 131.
47. See id. at 591, 571 S.E.2d at 132; see also America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Pub-
licly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350, 360, 542 S.E.2d 377, 383 (2001) ("Virginia courts should
grant comity to any order of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, entered in accor-
dance with the procedural and substantive law prevailing in its judicatory domain, when
that law, in terms of moral standards, societal values, personal rights, and public policy, is
reasonably comparable to that of Virginia." (quoting Oehl v. Oehl, 221 Va. 618, 623, 272
S.E.2d 441, 444 (1980))).
20071
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Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending ac-
tion, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and loca-
tion of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.48
Practitioners must take care in assessing the importance of mov-
ing for discovery of such data because it may be both costly and
time consuming. When relevant to the issues, however, no more
powerful evidence can be obtained. The strength of such evidence
comes from the neutrality of the third parties involved in the ob-
taining and retention of such data; such as telecommunications
carriers, cable companies, and ISPs.
In seeking electronic data, a host of issues may arise that are
unfamiliar to the practitioner who was raised on "paper discov-
ery." Notice is an important consideration in evaluating a search
for such data. For example, ISPs are required to notify subscrib-
ers of requests for subscribers' information, and the ISPs may as-
sert privilege claims on their behalf. 9 Requesting parties may
wish to employ experts, when necessary, and be prepared to ad-
here to protective orders limiting access and the use of the mate-
rials. Deleted data may be recaptured or restored later, unlike a
paper placed in the trash for delivery to the dump. Deleted data
will likely be the first thing sought and the last thing a party may
want to produce.
Ownership of a computer does not automatically grant access
to matters otherwise privileged. A test that could be applied in
the case of a computer owned by another or subject to use by
more than one person is whether the creator or user of such in-
formation had an expectation of privacy in the communications
made or kept; or whether the use of the computer was for an em-
ployer or for company business.
Factors to consider in the protection of such data from disclo-
sure would be the nature of the data transmitted, the authority of
the person accessing the data, and the expectation of privacy of
the person involved in the communication. Discovery requests
should be carefully tailored to avoid being attacked as overreach-
48. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1.
49. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1(A)(3)-(4) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
[Vol. 42:355
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ing. Specific requests must only consist of data that is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the underlying action. ° This may
include a request for the identification of the place where the data
is stored, the production of a hard drive, compact disk or floppy
disk, as well as the identification of, or access to, the application
software necessary to access the data.
Impediments to production may include such issues as: rele-
vancy and materiality; privilege; adherence to procedural guide-
lines; record keeping and capture; over-reaching (burdensome
discovery); spoliation; duplication; authentication; interpretation;
and the need for expert assistance.5 ' The Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia require the production of data compilations in a
reasonably useable form, including material translated by detec-
tion devices.52 Therefore, electronic data compilations are "docu-
ments" that are subject to production. 3 The fact that computers
may contain encrypted information does not appear to limit ac-
cess because the information could be obtained, albeit with
greater difficulty. It is best to request both printed and electronic
versions.
Any claim of privilege regarding electronic data must include a
privilege list, known in practice as a "Vaughn Index." 4 In devel-
oping a privilege list, the separation of privileged material from
that which is not privileged may prove difficult when the disputed
material is contained in computer storage. For instance, personal
privileged e-mail may be stored on a company computer. Where a
company permits the use of its computer for personal use, such
material may remain recoverable even after the employee has
ceased work with the business and turned in the computer. Em-
ployers should be advised with respect to such issues, and em-
ployees should be reminded of the nature of e-mail transmissions
and the manner in which they are kept and retained.
Interesting issues arise when evaluating discovery requests
and privilege claims related to electronic communications trans-
mitted through ISPs. If a privilege claim is asserted or contested,
50. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1.
51. See id.
52. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:9.
53. See id.
54. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1(b)(6); see generally Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827-28
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (setting forth indexing requirement).
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factors to consider might include: agreements between individu-
als and communications carriers such as ISPs; access to pass-
words necessary to unlock the stored data; past use of the storage
medium; and agreements between the owner and user. E-mail
content can be accessed by the ISP, and data deleted from the
hard drive of the sending or receiving computer may still be ac-
cessed on a server. Additionally, information retained by Internet
companies may be recovered by subpoena or court order.
There is a difference, however, between stored and intercepted
electronic data. An oral communication is protected where the
speaker expects the conversation not to be intercepted and cir-
cumstances justify that belief."5 E-mail may likewise be privi-
leged where the author has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
such communication, even though the e-mail is subject to inspec-
tion by an ISP or employer. Encryption, although unnecessary to
invoke the privilege, does heighten the level of security in the
conversation or transmission. Ownership of the storage medium
and the expectation of privacy in retaining data in the storage
medium serve as guideposts for Virginia courts in deciding claims
of privilege. For example, the right to correspond anonymously is
protected by the First Amendment, 6 and the Internet has been
recognized as a significant medium of communication subject to
ordinary First Amendment scrutiny." Furthermore, an ISP has
standing to assert some rights of its anonymous subscribers."
The attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine
play an important role in the discovery and use of electronic data
if the claim extends to electronic documents prepared by the at-
torney or supporting staff,5 9 or even electronic documents pre-
pared by the client with the intention of securing legal advice on
its contents.6 ° Electronic communications between officers and
55. Wilks v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 885, 888, 234 S.E.2d 250, 252 (1977) (wiretap
interception).
56. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995).
57. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850, 870 (1997) (ruling that Internet speech is
protected by the same level of First Amendment scrutiny as other media).
58. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1958) (noting that effect on
organization is considered where lists of members sought in discovery).
59. See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 235 Va. 499, 509-10, 370 S.E.2d 296, 301-02
(1988) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)).
60. See Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Westmoreland-LG&E Partners, 259 Va. 319, 325, 526
S.E.2d 750, 755 (2000) (citing Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 539-40, 25
S.E.2d 352, 360 (1943)).
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employees of the same entity relayed to corporate counsel for ob-
taining legal advice are also entitled to the attorney-client privi-
lege."1 Electronic materials prepared in anticipation of litigation
(i.e., work product) are shielded from discovery just like their
tangible equivalents, absent a showing of substantial need and
undue hardship in obtaining the substantial equivalent of such
materials by other means.
6 2
Some courts have used a test, as equally applicable to elec-
tronic evidence as to other evidence, to determine if materials are
considered work product because litigation was reasonably fore-
seeable at the time the materials were prepared.63 Once the party
asserting privilege meets the burden of demonstrating that the
materials in question were prepared in anticipation of litigation,
the opposing party must prove a substantial need for the informa-
tion and the inability to otherwise acquire the materials without
undue hardship.64
In Malone v. Ford Motor Co., the defendant corporation con-
tended that a computerized database used to manage informa-
tion, including documents furnished separately in discovery, was
work product because counsel assisted in the development and
updating of the database in anticipation of litigation. The court
held that the database was work product and reasoned that "[t]he
mere possibility that a party might not produce all relevant, un-
protected documents, is not a sufficient basis for ordering such a
party to disclose its entire computerized system of information
management."66 As rapid technological change continues, varied
degrees of capability in taking advantage of technology are inevi-
table between adverse parties. The court must strike a balance in
assessing undue burden claims, respecting the technological abili-
ties of the parties while preventing a perverse incentive to argue
lack of technological capabilities in order to avoid electronic dis-
covery requests.
61. Id. at 326, 526 S.E.2d at 755 (citing Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Watson,
243 Va. 128, 141, 413 S.E.2d 630, 638 (1992)).
62. VA. SuP. CT. R. 4:1(b)(3); see generally Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512 (establishing
burden to overcome work product protection).
63. See, e.g., Larson v. McGuire, 42 Va. Cir. 40, 42-43 (Cir. Ct. 1997) (Loudoun
County).
64. See id. at 43.
65. 29 Va. Cir. 456, 456-57 (Cir. Ct. 1992) (Loudoun County).
66. Id. at 459 (quoting Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 122 F.R.D.
567, 570 (N.D. Cal. 1988)).
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During the pretrial phase of litigation, Virginia practitioners
should work with their clients to ensure electronic data subject to
discovery is maintained because spoliation of electronic evidence
may merit sanctions if bad faith or prejudice can be proven.67 In
Gentry v. Toyota Motor Corp., an expert employed by the plain-
tiffs attorney removed a part from a car involved in an auto acci-
dent without authorization or permission.6" The Supreme Court
of Virginia ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion
when dismissing the case because there was no evidence of bad
faith on the part of the plaintiff, who had not authorized the ex-
pert's actions.69 When considering claims of the destruction of
evidence it is important to note that there is no independent
cause of action for spoliation of evidence in Virginia.7"
V. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Once the pretrial phase is complete, attention focuses on the
trial. In preparing for trial, the lawyer should be mindful of evi-
dentiary issues that may arise to ensure admission of critical
pieces of evidence. This would, in most cases, involve the harmo-
nizing of data collection and storage techniques with traditional
rules of evidence. A review of extant case authority reveals the
extent to which traditional rules of evidence may be applied to
the use of electronic data.
The admission of electronic evidence is controlled by common
law and statutory proscription. Where there exists a possibility of
contamination of evidence, the proponent of the exhibit must
demonstrate to a reasonable certainty that the evidence has not
been tampered with.71 The reasonable certainty requirement,
however, is not met if a "vital link in the chain of possession is
not accounted for ....
67. See, e.g., Gentry v. Toyota Motor Corp., 252 Va. 30, 34, 471 S.E.2d 485, 488 (1996).
68. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 486 (1996).
69. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 488. Additionally, the underlying theory of the case ultimately
rested on another part in the car that had not been damaged. Id.
70. See Austin v. Consolidation Coal Co., 256 Va. 78, 83-84, 501 S.E.2d 161, 163-64
(1998).
71. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 136, 138, 183 S.E.2d 179, 180 (1971).
72. Id.
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The admission of computer data that represents material gath-
ered by persons rather than gathered in response to electronic
stimuli is governed by the business records exception to the hear-
say rule.73 The reliability of electronic data is controlled by famil-
iar principles. Where the reliability of data generated by a com-
puter is dependent on proof of scientific accuracy, however, expert
testimony may be required. For example, information gathered by
a "call trap" placed on a telephone to record calls to a residence
requires a showing of reliability.74
In Penny v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that once the reliability of a call trap device has been proven,
the results attendant to its use may be received into evidence.75
The court in Penny, however, made clear that the "requirement of
proof of reliability for each call trap may not necessarily apply to
other instances involving computer generated data. ' 76 Because
the call trap is generally utilized for litigation purposes in an ad-
versarial process "of ferreting out criminal agents," the court rea-
soned an additional check for reliability is necessary.77 The court
reasoned that call trap evidence is just the recording of electronic
events without human interactions.7 Therefore, hearsay concerns
are unfounded as no out-of-court declarant exists who could be
subject to cross-examination. 9
In Tatum v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
found that "caller ID" data is also not hearsay because it is based
on computer generated information and is not a record of human
input and observation. 0
Call trap and caller ID evidence of telephone communications
are treated differently than computer recordings of the content of
conversation."' Under Virginia Code section 8.01-420.2, "[n]o me-
73. See Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 387, 345 S.E.2d 267, 279-80 (1986) (find-
ing the business records exception to the hearsay rule applies to computer printout from
the National Crime Information Center).
74. Penny v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 494, 499, 370 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Ct.. App.
1988).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 500 n.3, 370 S.E.2d at 317 n.3.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 498, 370 S.E.2d at 317.
79. See id.
80. 17 Va. App. 585, 588, 440 S.E.2d 133, 135 (Ct. App. 1994).
81. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.2 (Repl. Vol. 2000) (limitations on admissibility
in civil proceedings of recordings of telephone conversations).
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chanical recording, electronic or otherwise, of a telephone conver-
sation" can be admitted into evidence in any civil proceeding
unless all parties to the conversation are aware they are being re-
corded and certain other conditions are met.82 Under Virginia
Code section 19.2-61(b), an oral communication intercepted elec-
tronically is also protected where the speaker expects the conver-
sation not to be intercepted and the circumstances justify that be-
lief.8 3 The constitutional expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment is applied in such circumstances. 4 The contents of
an intercepted communication and the evidence derived from
such communications (both wire and oral) may be subject to sup-
pression in both criminal and civil cases.8 5
Individuals often identify themselves online using screen
names or e-mail addresses which complicates the process of iden-
tification. The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that the identity
of an individual corresponding over the Internet can be estab-
lished at trial by direct or circumstantial evidence such as e-mail
or participation in group discussions such as "chat rooms." 6 In
Bloom v. Commonwealth, the statements made over the Internet
by a defendant were properly admitted into evidence under the
party admission exception to the hearsay rule. 7 The measure of
proof necessary to establish identity and for the admission of such
evidence is by a preponderance of the evidence. 8 In Bloom, how-
ever, the Supreme Court of Virginia explicitly chose not to adopt
the trial court's assertion that conversations over the Internet are
analogous to conversations over the telephone reasoning that the
82. Id. Specifically, "all parties to the conversation were aware the conversation was
being recorded or (ii) the portion of the recording to be admitted contains admissions that,
if true, would constitute criminal conduct which is the basis for the civil action, and one of
the parties was aware of the recording and the proceeding is not one for divorce, separate
maintenance or annulment of a marriage. The parties' knowledge of the recording pursu-
ant to clause (i) shall be demonstrated by a declaration at the beginning of the recorded
portion of the conversation to be admitted into evidence that the conversation is being re-
corded. This section shall not apply to emergency reporting systems operated by police and
fire departments and by rescue squads, nor to any communications common carrier utiliz-
ing service observing or random monitoring pursuant to § 19.2-62." Id.
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-61(b) (Cum. Supp. 2007); see generally Wilks v. Common-
wealth, 217 Va. 885, 888, 234 S.E.2d 250, 252 (1977).
84. See Wilks, 217 Va. at 888-89, 234 S.E.2d at 252.
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-65 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
86. See Bloom v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 814, 820-21, 554 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2001).
87. Id. at 820, 554 S.E.2d at 87.
88. Id. at 821, 554 S.E.2d at 87 (citing Witt v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 670, 674, 212
S.E.2d 293, 296 (1975)).
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parties do not have the opportunity for voice recognition during
Internet communications. 9
VI. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
In addition to civil liability arising from actions performed with
computers, and the issues that arise from the use of computers
and electronic records in the litigation process, computers may be
used in the commission of crimes. Criminal proscriptions that
traditionally existed without the use of electronic media have
been extended into the digital world. For instance, the alteration
of public computer records has been held to constitute forgery de-
spite the absence of a traditional writing on paper. 9° Computer
activities may also be used as evidentiary support for traditional
crimes.91
Crimes specifically arising from the possession and use of com-
puters and computer networks have been identified by the Gen-
eral Assembly in the Virginia Computer Crimes Act ("VCCA").92
The Act does not explicitly preclude prosecution under other stat-
utes for crimes that may also fall under the VCCA unless clearly
inconsistent with the terms of the Act."3 The VCCA reflects a con-
tinued understanding of the importance of technology in society
while balancing the need to protect citizens from the pervasive
impact of global computer networks that reach into our homes
and businesses.
The VCCA makes it a crime to fraudulently use a computer to
obtain property, including money. 94 This prohibition has been
read broadly to include activities in furtherance of a theft, such as
checking vehicle identification numbers ("VIN") through the
89. Id. at 822 n.2, 554 S.E.2d at 88 n.2.
90. See Campbell v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 174, 176-78, 431 S.E.2d 648, 649-51
(1993).
91. See Barnes v. Commonwealth, No. 2693-98-1, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 204 (Ct. App.
Mar. 21, 2000) (unpublished decision). In Barnes, evidence of computer searches of a sto-
len vehicle database were used to show that a police officer was aware that property she
received was stolen. Id. at *4-6.
92. Act of Apr. 11, 1984, ch. 751, 1984 Va. Acts 1759 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-152.1 to -.15 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007)).
93. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.11 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
94. Id. § 18.2-152.3 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
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Commonwealth computer network to ascertain whether a vehicle
remained on a list of stolen vehicles.
95
The VCCA also makes it a crime to send spam e-mail, called
"Unsolicited Bulk Email" ("UBE") under certain circumstances. 96
Falsifying the transmission information or trafficking in software
designed to falsify that information is a misdemeanor.97 Sending
bulk e-mail to more than a certain number of intended recipients
or bulk e-mail that generates more than a certain amount of
revenue constitutes a class six felony.9" Additionally, the em-
ployment of a minor to violate the proscriptions on bulk e-mail is
a felony.99 The VCCA also creates civil liability for sending unso-
licited bulk e-mail, including significant statutory damages.1 00
A prosecution for a violation of the Virginia spam statute re-
sulted in a challenge based upon, among other things, constitu-
tional Due Process, Free Speech, and Commerce Clause viola-
tions.1" 1 While the trial court's conviction was affirmed by the
court of appeals,0 2 the matter is currently on appeal to the Su-
preme Court of Virginia.103
Computer trespass is defined to include a myriad of activities
that interfere with the normal functioning of a computer, or using
a computer or network to make unauthorized copies of data or
software.0 4 Computer trespass is a class one misdemeanor unless
the trespass causes damage to another's property in excess of
95. Barnes, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 204, at *4-6.
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.3:1 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
97. Id. § 18.2-152.3:1(A)(2)(ii)-(iii) (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007). Federal law
now supersedes most state anti-spam laws except for those like Virginia's that prohibit
falsity or deceit in any portion of an electronic mail message or attachments thereto. 15
U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1) (Supp. 2007).
98. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.3:1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007). The num-
ber of recipients is 10,000 recipients in a day, 100,000 within 30 days, or 1,000,000 in a
year; the revenue is $1,000 for a specific transmission or $50,000 from the customers of
any individual mail provider. Id.
99. Id. § 18.2-152.3:1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
100. Id. § 18.2-152.12(B)-(C) (Cum. Supp. 2007). If requested, courts have the ability to
protect the secrecy and security of parties engaged in litigation that arises out of the
VCCA. Id. § 18.2-152.12(D) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
101. See Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. 355, 357, 363, 365-67 (Cir. Ct. 2004)
(Loudoun County).
102. Jaynes v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 673, 704, 634 S.E.2d 357, 372 (Ct. App.
2006) (appeal docketed), No. 062388 (Va. Apr. 24, 2007).
103. See Supreme Court of Virginia Appeals Docketed, http://www.courts.state.va.us/
scv/appeals/062388.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
104. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
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$1,000, in which case it is a class six felony.'1 5 The section of the
statute proscribing computer trespass explicitly does not apply to
Virginia ISPs' e-mail filtering activities or to parental monitor-
ing. 06 It also explicitly allows parties to contract around the pro-
scription. 17 The VCCA also creates civil liability for computer
trespass regardless of malice. 08
Recognizing the power of computers and networks to access a
great deal of information, the Virginia General Assembly created
a protection against invasion of privacy using computers.' 9 The
VCCA makes it a class one misdemeanor to use a computer or
network to examine personal information, such as financial, em-
ployment, or identifying information about another person with-
out permission. 110 The violation is upgraded to a class six felony if
the perpetrator then sells or distributes the information, commits
the violation in the course of committing another crime, or has
previously been found guilty of the same act or a substantially
similar crime in the United States."' There is an exception for
persons collecting information that is reasonably needed for com-
puter security, for diagnostics or repair, or for purposes of identi-
fying a computer user." 2 Although the statute requires that the
person know he is without authority at the time the information
is examined,' the statute has been interpreted broadly.114 Theft
105. Id.. § 18.2-152.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
106. See id. § 18.2-152.4(C) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 18.2-152.12(A) (Cum. Supp. 2007). The statute of limitations for actions aris-
ing out of this section are contained in section 18.2-152.12(F). If requested, courts have the
ability to protect the secrecy and security of parties engaged in litigation that arises out of
the VCCA. Id. § 18.2-152.12(D) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
109. Act of Apr. 11, 1984, ch. 751, 1984 Va. Acts 1759 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-152.5 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
110. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.5(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
111. See id. § 18.2-152.5(C)--(E) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
112. See id. § 18.2-152.5(F) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
113. See id. § 18.2-152.5(A) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
114. See, e.g., Plasters v. Commonwealth, No. 1870-99-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 473 (Ct.
App. June 27, 2000) (unpublished decision) (decided under prior statute). In Plasters, a
dispatcher accessed personal information that was contained in the Virginia Criminal In-
formation Network while working as a police dispatcher. Id. at *2-3. The court of appeals
held that it did not matter the defendant did not know that accessing the personal infor-
mation was a crime, and it affirmed the defendant's convictions because of an on-screen
warning that information from the system was to be used for criminal justice purposes
only. Id. at *5-6. Plasters did draw a dissent, which noted that the handbook the employee
received did not contain an admonition against viewing the type of information involved,
while the release of other information was clearly defined as unauthorized by the hand-
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
of computer services is also a misdemeanor under the VCCA, or a
felony if the value of services stolen is over $2,500. 115
The VCCA defines the crime of personal trespass by computer
as the use of a computer or computer network to cause physical
injury to an individual.'16 This is a class six felony if committed
unlawfully but not maliciously, and a class three felony if done
maliciously." 7 Malice in this circumstance is defined in accor-
dance with familiar principles as the state of mind that results in
the completion of a wrongful act when the mind is within the con-
trol of reason and without justification or legal excuse."" There
has been at least one attempt to apply personal trespass by com-
puter to injuries to the profitability of a business, but it is not
clear that this extension can be maintained."9
Harassment by computer is also a crime defined by the
VCCA. 2° Harassment is a class 1 misdemeanor, which involves
using a computer or network to make one of a variety of obscene
or vulgar communications with the intent to harass or intimi-
date. 121
In Virginia Code section 18.2-152.8, the legislature provides a
laundry list of property subject to embezzlement, including com-
puters, networks, financial instruments, data, software, and all
other personal property. 122 The taking of these assets, whether
tangible or intangible, in a readable format, or even in transit be-
tween devices, is considered embezzlement. 123 The provision also
book. Id. at *8-9 (Benton, J., dissenting). The overall breadth of the privacy protection
may still not be well defined.
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.6 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
116. Id. § 18.2-152.7(A) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
117. Id. § 18.2-152.7(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
118. Saunders v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 321, 324, 523 S.E.2d 509, 510 (Ct. App.
2000).
119. See Saks Fifth Ave., Inc. v. James, Ltd., 272 Va. 177, 630 S.E.2d 304 (2006). Saks
involved a salesperson who switched employment to a competing firm and brought elec-
tronic customer records stored on his computer with him; he apparently contacted former
customers using e-mail. Id. at 182, 630 S.E.2d at 307. Saks was a civil dispute, but persons
injured by actions taken under any section of the Virginia Computer Crimes Act may re-
cover under Virginia Code section 18.2-152.12, which provides for civil actions. VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-152.12 (Cum. Supp. 2007). However, the trial court struck the evidence as to
the claim for conversion based on personal trespass by computer. See Saks, 272 Va. at 185
n.11, 630 S.E.2d at 309 n.ll.
120. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.7:1 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
121. Id.
122. Id. § 18.2-152.8 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
123. Id.
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applies to computer services.124 In Perk v. Vector Resources
Group, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the value of in-
formation contained in computer files was a matter of fact to be
decided at trial.125 Creating, altering, or deleting computer data
in a manner that would constitute forgery on traditional media is
deemed to be forgery under the VCCA.'26 The Act also makes it
an independent misdemeanor to willfully use encryption in fur-
therance of any criminal activity. 127
Computer crimes have not escaped the implications of forfei-
ture. In Virginia, all computer equipment, software, and other
personal property used in a computer crime defined by the VCCA
can be subject to forfeiture.12 There is also a specific statute of
limitations provision for crimes arising out of the VCCA-
misdemeanors pursuant to the VCCA must be prosecuted within
five years of the last act constituting the violation, or one year af-
ter the act or identity of the offender was discovered.129 A crimi-
nal prosecution for an act proscribed by the VCCA has a wide
choice of venues. Venue may lie where any of the acts in further-
ance of the crime were committed, where the owner has a princi-
pal place of business, where the offender has control or possession
of material used to commit the crime, where access to a computer
or network was made, where the offender resides, or where a
124. Id. § 18.2-152.8(3) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
125. 253 Va. 310, 315, 485 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1997). Perk was a civil case based on the
computer crimes act. Id. The plaintiff, an attorney who had been hired to collect on the
defendant's outstanding debts, claimed that he had invested substantial time and money
in creating his own computer programs and databases for the project, and that the defense
had converted programs, databases, software, and data in violation of the statute. Id. at
313, 485 S.E.2d at 142. The defense claimed that the items allegedly converted were noth-
ing more than the plaintiffs client's lists, that they belonged to the employer and that the
lists were of no value to the plaintiff once the contract had been terminated. Id. at 315,
485 S.E.2d at 143. The trial court granted a demurrer. Id. at 312, 485 S.E.2d at 141-42.
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the question of whether those items had value to
the contractor other than his obligations to his employer was a matter of proof that cannot
be decided on demurrer. Id. at 315, 485 S.E.2d at 143.
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.14 (Repl. Vol. 2004); see also Commonwealth v. Becht-
ler, 56 Va. Cir. 186 (Cir. Ct. 2001) (Rockingham County). In Bechtler, this section of the
VCCA was held not to extend to copies of the seal on the Virginia driver's license, because
the image on the license is not actually the Virginia seal, but a mere representation. Id. at
187. Because the statute imputes liability for what would be a crime without a computer,
the court dismissed the indictment because the underlying conduct would not be consid-
ered a forgery. Id.
127. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.15 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
128. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.17 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
129. Id. § 19.2-8 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
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computer that was an instrument or object of the crime was at
the time of the commission.
131
One area of traditional criminal law that is particularly rele-
vant to changing electronic technology is wiretapping. Wiretap-
ping laws were enacted to allow law enforcement officers to re-
spond to a different generation of criminal activity with new and
innovative technology. Traditional privacy concerns are reflected
in the Interception of Wire, Electronic, or Oral Communications
Act ("IWEOCA").13' The Act has broad applications-defining, for
instance, "electronic communication systems" as including com-
puter facilities. 132 The Act makes it a felony to unlawfully:
i. Intentionally intercept, or procure another to intercept, any
wire, electronic, or oral communication;
ii. Intentionally use, or procure another to use, an electronic,
mechanical, or other device to intercept an oral communication;
iii. Intentionally disclose the contents of a wire, electronic, or
oral communication knowing that it was obtained through an
interception of a wire, electronic, or oral communication; or
iv. Intentionally use the contents of a wire, electronic, or oral
communication knowing it to have been obtained through in-
terception.
133
There are, however, exceptions. The exceptions for communica-
tions service providers relate primarily to activities arising in the
normal course of business or service quality checks, as well as in
assistance to law enforcement officers who are authorized to in-
tercept communications. 134 While the statute allows service pro-
viders to intercept communications, they are prevented from di-
vulging the contents of any communications.' 35 Another exception
is made for situations where one of the parties to the communica-
tion has consented. 131 Other exceptions are made for communica-
tions that are already accessible to the general public and radio
130. Id. § 19.2-249.2 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
131. See id. §§ 19.2-61 to -70.3 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
132. Id. § 19.2-61 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
133. Id. § 19.2-62(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
134. Id. § 19.2-62(B)(1), (3)(f) (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
135. Id. § 19.2-62(C) (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
136. Id. § 19.2-62(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
[Vol. 42:355
ELECTRONIC DATA
communications such as those made on emergency, nautical, or
amateur frequencies. 13
7
Detailed procedures are set forth for court ordered authoriza-
tion of the interception of wire, electronic, and oral communica-
tions. 3 ' Less stringent procedures are provided in the case of the
disclosure of customer and subscriber information, excluding the
contents of electronic communication.' 39 While electronic commu-
nication transfers are subject to detailed procedures in the
IWEOCA, the contents of e-mail stored with a service provider
would be subject to the general requirements for the issuance of a
search warrant.'40 Virginia makes good faith reliance by a person
upon a court order or legislative authorization a complete defense
to an action for unlawful interception, disclosure, or use.'4
IWEOCA defines "pen registers" and tracing devices sepa-
rately.142 A pen register is a device that records dialing, routing,
addressing, or signal information transmitted by an instrument
(but not the contents of the communication) while a "trap and
trace device" captures incoming electronic identifiers.'43 The Act
excludes any device used for billing from its pen register defini-
tion.'4 4 Pen registers are banned under the Act, absent a court
order, and have different exceptions than those for content-based
communications. 4 ' The Act makes it a class one misdemeanor to
use a pen register or trap and trace without a court order.'46 The
only exceptions to this are for service providers using the routing
information to test or maintain equipment, record the fact that a
communication occurred to protect from fraud or abuse of service,
or where the user consents. 1
4 7
Evidence from pen registers used at the request of one party to
a communication is admissible in criminal proceedings. For in-
137. Id. § 19.2-62(B)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
138. Id. § 19.2-68 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
139. See id. § 19.2-70.3 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
140. See id. § 19.2-53 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
141. Id. § 19.2-69 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
142. Id. § 19.2-61 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Compare id. § 19.2-70.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004), with id. § 19.2-62(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004 &
Cum. Supp. 2007).
146. Id. § 19.2-70.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004). The statute provides specific regulations for when
a court order will be issued in section 19.2-70.2. Id. § 19.2-70.2 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
147. See id. § 19.2-70.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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stance, in Harmon v. Commonwealth, the telephone company, at
the customer's request, attached a pen register to the phone line
where they were receiving obscene telephone calls.148 The com-
pany took this action without police involvement.'49 The Supreme
Court of Virginia upheld the trial court's admission of the evi-
dence from the pen register.
150
The Virginia wiretap laws, like the VCCA, create civil liability
for perpetrators.15' People whose communications are used or dis-
closed unlawfully in violation of the Act can recover both compen-
satory and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees.'52 An oral
communication, however, is protected where the speaker expects
the conversation not to be intercepted and the circumstances jus-
tify that belief.'53 The contents of an intercepted communication
and the evidence derived from those communications (both wire
and oral) are subject to suppression in both criminal and civil
cases. 154
VII. FEDERAL LESSONS
The revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may give some
guidance in the treatment of electronic discovery requests. The
Federal Rules address the emerging role of electronic data in the
discovery process by recognizing that "electronic information
must be treated on equal footing with paper documents." 55 Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a) now specifically includes "elec-
tronically stored information" as discoverable material in a re-
quest for production of documents.' 56 The revised Federal Rules
now require that if a request for electronically stored information
148. 209 Va. 574, 575-76, 166 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1969). Harmon dealt with application of
a federal statute that was substantively similar to Virginia law as to the wiretapping is-
sue. For example, see 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000).
149. Harmon, 209 Va. at 577, 166 S.E.2d at 234-35.
150. Id. at 579, 166 S.E.2d at 235.
151. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-69 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
152. Id. § 19.2-69(1)-(3) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
153. See Wilks v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 885, 889, 234 S.E.2d 250, 252.
154. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-65 (Repl. Vol. 2004). As has been demonstrated in other
jurisdictions, however, information stored on a computer may not be subject to suppres-
sion. See White v. White, 781 A.2d 85, 87 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001).
155. Jason Krause, E-Discovery Gets Real, 93 A.B.A. J., Feb. 2007, at 44, 46.
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a). But cf. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:9(a) (no provision for "electronically
stored information").
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does not specify the form for production, the information is to be
produced in the form ordinarily maintained or the form reasona-
bly useable. 15 7 Additionally, the Federal Rules do not require pro-
duction in more than one form.' The importance of electronic
data and the possibility of its unprecedented volume is therefore
apparent throughout the pretrial process.
If the Commonwealth adopted similar language regarding the
production of electronic databases along with electronic docu-
ments themselves, issues such as those addressed in Malone
could easily be resolved.'59 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)
was also amended to excuse a party from producing discoverable
electronic data if it is not "reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost." 6° The burden remains on the producing party to
make the required showing. 161
In perhaps the most widely known federal case regarding elec-
tronic discovery issues, Zubulake v. USB Warburg LLC, the de-
fendant failed to take the necessary steps to ensure that discov-
erable electronic data was preserved by failing to communicate
the litigation hold to all relevant parties. 162 As a result, the pro-
duction of electronic information was unacceptably delayed and
relevant information was destroyed. 1
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Before the Federal Rules were amended, the Zubulake court
developed a methodical approach (to apply to federal and state
litigation) to assess the cost of electronic discovery and to consider
if cost shifting is appropriate. 164 In an earlier decision within the
Zubulake series of cases, the court developed a seven-factor cost-
shifting test regarding electronic discovery disputes. 165 Electronic
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(ii).
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(iii). But cf. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:9(b).
159. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
160. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); cf. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1.
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
162. 229 F.R.D. 422, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The seven
factors were:
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant
information; 2. The availability of such information from other sources; 3.
The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy; 4. The
total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each party; 5.
The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; 6.
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data can be an amorphous concept, particularly within a business
setting where employees generate numerous e-mails, instant
messages, and other bits of data as part of their daily activities. 1
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Given the vast amounts of electronic data that can be accumu-
lated at both a personal and corporate level, the costs associated
with discovery of electronic data in both federal and state litiga-
tion can be immense.
The beauty of the new federal system is that even given the
unprecedented scale of information stored electronically, the
unique impact of electronic data on the discovery process can be
managed from the beginning through increased interaction be-
tween and disclosure by the parties. 167 Complex issues can be ad-
dressed once initial disclosures are made and the parties can rely
on the new rules rather than case-by-case decisions on electronic
discovery issues."'6 The already robust Virginia common law that
has emerged regarding electronic discovery could be greatly en-
hanced if the Supreme Court of Virginia chose to adopt the
amended federal rules.
Lastly, court rules should give clear guidance to the litigants as
to what is expected and the consequences of a failure to meet ex-
pressed expectations. In the nascent area of the law described in
this article, no clearer statement respecting the handling of elec-
tronic data in the litigation process is to be found than the follow-
ing:
[C]ounsel has a duty to effectively communicate to her client its
discovery obligations so that all relevant information is discov-
ered, retained, and produced. In particular, once the duty to pre-
serve attaches, counsel must identify sources of discoverable infor-
mation .... when the duty to preserve attaches, counsel must put in
place a litigation hold and make that known to all relevant employ-
ees by communicating with them directly. The litigation hold in-
structions must be reiterated regularly and compliance must be
monitored. Counsel must also call for employees to produce copies of
relevant electronic evidence, and must arrange for the segregation
and safeguarding of any archival media.., that the party has a duty
to preserve.
The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and 7. The relative
benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.
Id.
166. See Krause, supra note 155.
167. See id.
168. See id.
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Once counsel takes these steps (or once a court order is in place), a
party is fully on notice of its discovery obligations. If a party acts
contrary to counsel's instructions or to a court's order, it acts at its
own peril. 
169
VIII. CONCLUSION
Creativity, advocacy, and a respect for precedent have been the
guiding lights for the practice of law ever since man came to real-
ize that disputes could be settled in peace. Sometimes these pre-
cepts come in conflict. Lawyers and judges will always be chal-
lenged to develop new strategies to address novel substantive and
procedural issues arising out of the application of the law to
emerging technologies. Courts and legislative bodies must con-
tinue to determine whether the traditional rules of the adversary
process are capable of affording a fair, prompt, and efficient reso-
lution to situations implicating the use of computers, cell phones,
pagers, the Internet, iPods, and a host of electronic media.
The Internet has become a personal companion, a home for
public debate, a marketplace, a bank, and a library. It offers ac-
cess to millions of possible readers. Electronic devices have an
impact on every aspect of our daily lives-both business and
pleasure. What paper was to thousands of years of recorded his-
tory, the computer chip is to the future. Virginia has been a
leader in the advancement and use of these new technologies and
has managed successfully to apply fundamental concepts of law to
new technology without compromising judicial values or allowing
the new technology to fundamentally change the system. It is the
goal of this article to demonstrate to the practitioner that elec-
tronic data and other emerging technologies are nothing to be
feared.
Electronic data is just that-data. How that data is used is not
solely dependent on technology but also on the moral, legal, and
ethical standards that benefit from stare decisis and contempo-
rary social thought.
A common law and statutory framework already exists in the
Commonwealth to allow for successful litigation strategies that
take advantage of the benefits of electronic data. Time-tested le-
169. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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gal theories and ethical standards equip practitioners and jurists
alike to maintain a principled approach to the practice of law
even when technological innovation changes the form of informa-
tion.
